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The “deadly d’s”:  Sharp economic downturns follow banking crises;  with 
government revenues dragged down, fiscal deficits worsen; deficits lead to debt; as debt 
piles up rating downgrades follow.  For the most fortunate countries, it does not end in 
default.  
 
 
Even a cursory reading of the global financial press in the past few months would 
lead one to despair that the world economy is moving through dark and uncharted waters. 
But, in fact, there is precedent. 
In a recent paper, Kenneth Rogoff and I examined the international experience 
with episodes of severe banking crises.  The depth, duration and characteristics of the 
economic slump following the crises traced out a few empirical regularities. 1 Our main 
findings in that paper can be summarized as follows:  
 Financial crises are protracted affairs.  
 Asset market collapses are deep and prolonged.   
Real housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over six years. 
 
Equity price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three and 
a half years.  
 
                                                 
1 “The Aftermath of Financial Crises,” (with Kenneth S. Rogoff), American Economic Review, 
forthcoming, May 2009. http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html 
 
 
 There are profound declines in output and employment.  
The unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points over the 
down phase of the cycle, which lasts on average over four years.  
 
Real GDP per capita falls (from peak to trough) an average of over 9 
percent, the duration of the downturn averages roughly two years.   
 
 There are significant adverse consequences of the financial crisis on government 
finances.  
  
Tax revenues shrink as the economic conditions deteriorate, the fiscal 
deficit worsens markedly, and the real value of government debt tends to 
explode, rising an average of 86 percent in the major post–World War II 
episodes.  
 
In the remainder of this note, I elaborate on these points.  I follow up with a 
sketch of how the crisis, deteriorating economic conditions, and more precarious fiscal 
fundamentals impact sovereign risk in the aftermath of the crises episodes. 
 
DOWNTURN 
 It is now beyond contention that the present U.S. financial crisis is severe by any 
metric.  As a result, we focus on systemic financial crises.  The “big five” advanced 
economy crises include episodes in Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), 
Sweden (1991), and Japan (1992).  Famous emerging market episodes in our study 
include the 1997–1998 Asian crisis (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand), Colombia (1998), and Argentina (2001).  Central to the 
analysis is historical housing price data, which can be difficult to obtain and are critical 
for assessing the present episode.  We therefor include two earlier historical cases for 
which housing prices are available, Norway in 1899 and the United States in 1929.  
Figure 1 looks at the bust phase in housing price cycles surrounding banking 
crises, including the current episode in the United States and a number of other countries 
now experiencing banking crises: Austria, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom.  Ongoing crises are in dark shading, and past crises are in light shading.  
The cumulative decline in real housing prices from peak to trough averages 35.5 percent.2  
 
The most severe real housing price declines were experienced by Finland, the 
Philippines, Colombia and Hong Kong.  Their crashes were 50 to 60 percent, measured 
from peak to trough.  The housing price decline experienced by the United States to date 
                                                 
2 The historical average, which is shaded in black in the diagram, does not include the ongoing crises. 
FIGURE 1. Past and ongoing real house price cycles and banking crises: Peak-to-trough price 
declines (left panel) and years duration of downturn (right panel) 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a). 
 
during the current episode (almost 28 percent according to the Case–Shiller index) is 
already more than twice that registered in the U.S. during the Great Depression.  The 
duration of housing price declines is quite long-lived, averaging roughly six years.  Even 
excluding the extraordinary experience of Japan, the average remains over five years. 
As illustrated in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a), the equity price declines that 
accompany banking crises are far steeper than are housing price declines, if somewhat 
shorter lived.  The average historical decline in equity prices is 55.9 percent, with the 
downturn phase of the cycle lasting 3.4 years.  Notably, during the current cycle, Iceland 
and Austria have already experienced peak-to-trough equity price declines far exceeding 
the average of the historical comparison group. On average, unemployment rises for 
almost five years, with an increase in the unemployment rate of about 7 percentage 
points. While none of the postwar episodes rivals the rise in unemployment of over 20 
percentage points experienced by the United States during the Great Depression, the 
employment consequences of financial crises are large in many cases. 
Figure 2 looks at increases in unemployment rates across the historical episodes.  
 
 
The emerging markets, particularly those in Asia, do better in terms of 
unemployment than do the advanced economies (Figure 2).  There are well-known data 
issues in comparing unemployment rates across countries, as widespread 
“underemployment” in many emerging markets and the vast informal sector are not 
captured in the official unemployment statistics.  
FIGURE 2. Past unemployment cycles and banking crises: Trough-to-peak percent increase in 
the unemployment rate (left panel) and years duration of downturn (right panel) 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a). 
 
As to real per capita GDP around banking crises, the average magnitude of the 
decline is 9.3 percent.  The declines in real GDP are smaller for advanced economies than 
for emerging market economies.  A probable explanation for the more severe 
contractions in emerging market economies is that they are prone to abrupt reversals in 
the availability of foreign credit.  When foreign capital comes to a “sudden stop,” to use 
the phrase coined by Guillermo Calvo, economic activity heads into a tailspin. 34 The 
cycle from peak to trough in GDP is much shorter, only two years.   
DEFICITS 
 
 Declining revenues and  higher expenditures owing to a combination of bailout 
costs and higher transfer payments and debt servicing costs lead to a rapid and marked 
worsening in the fiscal balance.  The episodes of Finland and Sweden stand out in this 
regard, as the latter went from a pre-crisis surplus of  nearly 4 percent of GDP to a 
whopping 15 percent deficit-to-GDP ratio. 
  
                                                 
3 Calvo, Guillermo A., Alejandro Izquierdo, and Rudy Loo-Kung (2006)  “Relative Price Volatility Under 
Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance Sheet Effects,” Journal of International Economics  9(1): 231–
254. 
 
4  When no foreign financing is possible, emerging markets have seen consumption and investment 
implode during financial crises. 
 TABLE 1. Fiscal deficits 
Country (crisis year) Year before the crisis Peak deficit (year) Increase (- decrase) in 
the the fiscal deficit 
Central government balance/GDP 
 
Argentina, 2001 
 
-2.4 
 
-11.9  (2002) 
 
9.5 
Chile, 1980 4.8 -3.2 (1985) 8.0 
Colombia, 1998 -3.6 -7.4  (1999) 3.8 
Finland, 1991 1.0 -10.8 (1994) 11.8 
Indonesia, 1997 2.1 -3.7 (2001) 5.8 
Japan, 1992 -0.7 -8.7 (1999) 9.4 
Korea, 1997 0.0 -4.8 (1998) 4.8 
Malaysia, 1997 0.7 -5.8(2000) 6.5 
Mexico, 1994 0.3 -2.3 (1998) 2.6 
Io.Norway, 1987 5.7 -2.5 (1992) 7.9 
Spain, 1977 1 -3.9 -3.1 (1977) -0.8 
Sweden, 1991 3.8 -11.6(1993) 15.4 
Thailand, 1997 2.3 -3.5(1999) 5.8 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b).5 
1 Spain was the only country in our sample to show an increase (modest) in per capita GDP 
growth during the post-crisis period. 
 
 
DEBT 
 
Figure 3 shows the rise in real government debt in the three years following a 
banking crisis.  The deterioration in government finances is striking, with an average debt 
rise of over 86 percent.  We look at percentage increase in debt, rather than debt-to-GDP, 
because sometimes steep output drops would complicate interpretation of debt–GDP 
ratios.  As Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) note, the characteristic huge buildups in 
government debt are driven mainly by sharp falloffs in tax revenue. The much publicized 
bank bailout costs are typically second order. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Reinhart, Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009) This Time is Different: Eight Hundred Years of 
Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). 
 FIGURE 5.5. Cumulative increase in real public debt in the three years following the 
banking crisis 
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Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein. 
 
DOWNGRADES (AND SOMETIMES DEFAULT)
Institutional Investor sovereign ratings cycles and banking crises: 
Peak-to-trough index declines (left panel) and years duration of downturn (right panel) 
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CONCLUSIONS (NOT DELUSIONS) 
 An examination of the aftermath of severe financial crises shows deep and lasting 
effects on asset prices, output and employment.  Unemployment rises and housing price 
declines extend out for five and six years, respectively.  Even recessions sparked by 
financial crises do eventually end, albeit almost invariably accompanied by massive 
increases in government debt.  The crises, more often than not, adversely impact 
sovereign creditworthiness, as reflected in a higher risk premia.  The effects, however, do 
not appear to be “permanent.” 
  
The global nature of the present crisis will make it far more difficult for many 
countries to grow their way out through higher exports.  The growth slowdown is 
amplified in world commodity markets, as many emerging markets face steep declines in 
their terms of trade.   If historical patterns hold, the current lull in sovereign defaults or 
restructurings in emerging markets will likely to come to an end, particularly if the 
recovery process in the world’s largest economies is delayed. 6  Ecuador has already 
defaulted and others are teetering on the brink. 
                                                 
6 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b). 
